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ABSTRACT 
The article elucidates three important concepts and realities that refer to cognitive phenomena and  
are often (mistakenly) used as synonyms: consciousness (slo. zavest), mind (slo. um), and spirit (slo. 
duh). They present three levels of human cognition: individual-experiential, individual-mental, and 
trans-individual-mental. Simply put: the concept of consciousness pertains to the waking mental life 
of a human being, while the concept of mind pertains to the ability and activity to consciously comprehend and 
understand contents and objects of human activity. I delineate three “types” of spirit: personal spirit, 
objective spirit, and the objectification of spirit in productions of human culture; I have doubts, however, 
about the existence of cosmic or super-cosmic dimensions of spirit, although some interpretations of 
quantum physics and modern cosmology suggest that such dimensions are possible. 
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The article purports to provide a provisional account of three central concepts associated with 
cognition (construed broadly). These concepts are often used interchangeably, almost 
synonymously; however, I feel that this imprecise usage is a rather unfortunate affair, as it 
not only blurs important distinctions between different modes and aspects of cognition, but it 
also obscures the being and essence of important “realities”, which determine the cognitive 
and mental life of human beings. This, in turn, is likely to have detrimental consequences 
for the development of cognitive science. As already mentioned, my account makes no 
pretense of being comprehensive: instead of a full-blown definition its goal is to offer a 
preliminary (tentative) sketch. Consciousness, mind, and spirit stand for three fundamental, 
yet different levels of human cognition: individual-experiential, individual-mental, and 
trans-individual-mental, which cannot be reduced to either of the two previous levels. 
CONSCIOUSNESS (SLO. ZAVEST) 
Let us start with the notion of consciousness. In general terms, “consciousness” denotes the 
mental state of being awake. Unfortunately, there is but one word in Slovene language to 
designate such a state, namely zavest (“consciousness”), even though the concept itself stands 
for an array of different phenomena, states, and processes, which are closely interrelated and 
form a loose network of similarities and commonalities. Recently, there have been attempts 
to introduce the notion of čuječnost (“mindfulness”), particularly in relation to certain 
meditative states; a similar role is designated to terms such as pozornost (“awareness”), 
predočenje (“presentation”), and občutenje (“sensation”, “feeling”). Unfortunately, all these 
terms seem to occupy a relatively fixed semantic domain in “normal” Slovene, and usually 
relate to specific, mostly short-term (transient) forms of the waking mental life, and not to the 
more general and permanent mental states and processes. In English, these permanent aspects 
and modes of consciousness can be expressed by several different terms, e.g. 
“consciousness”, “awareness”, “sense”, etc., which makes it far more suitable for precise 
conceptual thought. German language has more affinities with Slovene, in that it has one all-
encompassing term for consciousness (das Bewußtstein), while other modifications and/or 
states of consciousness require further “descriptors” or “qualifiers”. 
The concept of consciousness refers primarily to the waking mental state of an individual; 
occasionally, however, it can be used, albeit mostly metaphorically, to denote non- or  
trans-individual activities of human beings (e.g., collective, social, national, etc. 
consciousness). In this paper, I intend to focus exclusively on its primary (individual) 
meaning, i.e., consciousness as a waking mental state of an individual. Closer inspection 
reveals that the concept encompasses at least three different processes: being aware of sense 
objects and corresponding feelings; being aware of one’s “affects” (emotions, passions, and 
volitions); and being aware of one’s thoughts. English language distinguishes between 
“consciousness” conceived as a quality of intentional mental state, which is often expressed 
with the verb “to be aware of…”, and “awareness” (in nominal use), which refers to the 
mental state of sensing and feeling something in the more general sense. 
“Awareness” construed in this broader sense does not have to be intentional, i.e. it does not 
have to have an object, but can also denote spontaneous awareness of what is currently 
“going on” around and/or within us. The Slovene notion of consciousness (and the same 
holds true for its German equivalent) is much more closely related to intentionality, and 
denotes subject’s object-determined knowledge of something. It is true that this knowledge 
does not necessarily have to be propositional – it can consist of, say, bare noticing of sense 




but it is still object-oriented (e.g. I am aware of a meadow, perhaps even of a lush green 
meadow, in front of me; I am aware of having a pain in a certain part of my body, of a given 
emotion, feeling, etc.). 
If a Slovene speaker wants to describe her spontaneous awareness of what is currently 
happening around and/or within her, she is forced to resort to terms such as “sensing”, 
“experiencing”, “facing”, etc., which designate qualified ways of being aware that need to be 
distinguished from the more basic forms of attention. In my view, it is important to distinguish 
between the purely experiential aspect (moment) from the object- or content-related aspect 
(moment) of consciousness. The former corresponds to the English term “awareness”, while 
the latter corresponds to “consciousness”. However, definitional issues do not stop here: there 
remains at least one further aspect that needs to be resolved, namely the problem of 
self-awareness. Some authors feel that for every act of consciousness there is a corresponding 
rudimentary sense of self. The notion of self-awareness, of being aware of one’s self, is, 
again, extremely complex, and I will not go into an in-depth analysis here; I do believe, 
however, that it is important to distinguish between a rudimentary, “nonsensical” sense of 
one’s self, which is present in simply being awake, and more elaborate cognitive forms of 
self-awareness, which also include mental or verbal forms of self-awareness (i.e. self-reflection). 
It seems very unlikely that the latter can be found in all conscious beings and all forms of 
self-experiencing. Consciousness as self-knowledge or self-reflection also constitutes the core 
of the Latin term conscientia, in which all modern conceptions of human consciousness are 
rooted. As to the general concept of consciousness, I feel that it denotes a more rudimentary 
sense of one’s self, a sense which does not necessarily have to be present in every state of 
awareness; rather, it arises only when a conscious being becomes aware of what is happening 
to it. The possibility of directing one’s awareness towards one’s self is always an open 
(in-principle) possibility for the living being; but it depends on different “subjective” and 
“objective” circumstances whether this possibility is eventually realized (enacted) or not. 
For this reason, I distinguish three aspects (moments) of consciousness: in addition to purely 
experiential and objective, there is also the self-aware aspect. The purely experiential aspect 
is the most fundamental of the three, and serves as the basis for the other two moments. It 
bears emphasizing that the objective and the self-aware aspect seem to be relatively 
independent from one another, because a living being, in being self-aware, does not 
necessarily take its self as an object of consciousness. This latter move occurs only when 
mental activity (i.e. thinking) “enters the picture”. Similarly, a living being that is aware of a 
given object is not necessarily a being that is also self-aware. The latter holds true only if the 
living being conceives of the object as “its” object, i.e., if it relates the object to itself (in a 
human being this would mean relating it to her “self”). 
The concept of consciousness thus cannot be reduced to only one aspect, as it encompasses a 
rich and complex world of experience, reference, and self-reference. It is for this reason that 
some theoreticians of consciousness refrain from using exhaustive definitions, and are satisfied 
by merely providing a list of some of its fundamental characteristics. For example, in her 
“introductory” book on consciousness, Susan Blackmore seems to be perfectly content with 
specifying some of the key features of consciousness, i.e., the fact that it corresponds to the 
state of “what is it like to be an …”, and of having ineffable experiential or phenomenal 
qualities (qualia) [1; p.7]. In her account of these key features, Blackmore draws on the famous 
article “What is it like to be a bat” by Thomas Nagel, in which the author argues that the 
experiential perspective of a given being (e.g. a bat) can be enacted only by that being itself [2]. 
Similarly, in his latest book, David Chalmers reduces the notion of consciousness to 
“phenomenal consciousness”, to “being as …”, or more precisely: “[A]n organism is 
conscious if there is something it is like to be that organism, and a mental state is conscious if 
there is something it is like to be in that state” [3; p.5]. 
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Imposing self-limitations on one’s definitions is, indeed, a wise and laudable undertaking, but 
one quickly notices that all of the enumerated “qualities” of consciousness refer only to its 
non-intentional (purely experiential) aspects, while omitting the objective and self-aware 
dimensions. 
It is for this reason that we must, at the very outset, decide what it is that we are talking about 
when we are talking about consciousness: Are we referring merely to a non- or 
pre-intentional “state” of awareness or do we mean other aspects of consciousness as well? 
For example, it is well known that, for Brentano and other phenomenologists, the objective 
aspect was of primary importance, while German idealists (from Kant to Hegel) emphasized 
the reflective (self-aware) aspect. The verdict on which of the three aspects is the most 
fundamental is still out, but in my view, this role should be assigned to the experiential 
aspect, although the other two aspects are also present in the conscious life of an adult human 
being, and seem to be more important for a meaningful and competent existence. 
MIND (SLO. UM) 
The concept of “mind”, spanning innumerable historical and cultural definitions and 
distinctions, is beset by even more difficulties. For our purposes, the concept will denote the 
human ability and activity of consciously grasping and understanding specific contents and 
objects of human activity. In other words, it will (roughly) encompass the semantic field of 
two traditional notions, namely that of intellectus and ratio. The distinction between the 
factual process of thinking and understanding on the one hand, and the normative rules for 
the “appropriate” use of thinking on the other, have significantly widened the gap between 
intellectus and ratio, with the former encompassing the totality of factual thought and the 
latter referring to the “correct”, “rational” or “essential” thought. I will use the concept of 
“mind” to denote all human intellectual cognitive abilities without any normative 
presuppositions, e.g. without the requirement that thinking and speaking be rational. By doing 
so, I will be slightly modifying the terminology that I have originally used in my book Logos 
spoznanja (Eng. Logos of Knowledge), where the general sense of “mind” was relegated to 
the concept of “reason”. As it turns out, the “requirement of rationality” is merely an 
addendum: it is closely related to the concept of scientific knowledge and to critical 
examination of knowledge and practice, and must therefore be treated separately (I will not 
pursue this topic further in this article). 
It is true, however, that we can, and must, distinguish between different forms and levels of 
thought, e.g. between ideational, conceptual, and intuitive thought; in this sense, it is then also 
possible to speak of three levels or modes of the mind: ideational, conceptual, and intuitive mind. 
Ideational thought is founded on subjective assumptions, ideas, views, and evaluations of a 
thinking subject. Its “conclusions” have evolved in specific (limited) contexts, but are often 
uncritically generalized across all individuals and all circumstances. This type of thinking can 
be very successful in everyday life, with the tacit assumption that people around us think, feel, 
and evaluate the world and life situations in fairly similar and uniform ways. It can, however, 
quickly go astray, if this assumption proves false, and we end up facing people who are “different” 
from us and demand that we acknowledge the validity of their unique views. In the Ancient 
Greece, this state of affairs was taken up by the sophists, who soon ended up espousing 
unbridled relativism, which Socrates then tried to supersede with his conceptual dialectics. 
By drawing on the idea of a concept as a mentally objective entity, conceptual thought tries to 
move beyond the limits of ideational thinking. For Socrates, concepts stood for the inwardly 
perceived essences of things, and were said to garner insights into their necessary and 




type would not be what it is; sufficient properties, on the other hand, imply that we are 
dealing with a thing of a specific sort. The verbal “recapitulation” of necessary and sufficient 
properties was believed to furnish an unequivocal definition of a given concept: to know a 
concept is to know its definition. The Socratic conception of a concept is thus related to essences, 
and the latter are, in turn, related to types of things, not to individual things; consequently, 
there can be no concepts and thus no objective understanding of individual things. 
The Socratic conception of a concept is founded on the view that construes types and sorts of 
individual things as objective realities, which is why it soon gave birth to a variety of 
conceptual idealisms, as manifested in Plato’s and (to a lesser degree) Aristotle’s 
philosophies. For a long time, Aristotle’s definition of a thing (substance) was deemed 
“classical”: in order to be able to define a thing (substance) we need to specify its genus 
proximum and differentia specifica. “Genus proximum” stands for the sum of all necessary 
properties, while “differentia specifica” stands for the sum of all sufficient properties. 
In light of subsequent developments in philosophy and science, it has gradually become 
obvious that the Socratic conception is untenable, as it fails to garner definitions of concepts 
and ideas that would successfully transcend the relativism of ideational thought. Traditional 
conceptual definitions are exceedingly rare and can be attained only if founded on a priori 
“reliable” sources. In the late Antiquity and Middle Ages, the latter included religious 
dogmas and some of Aristotle’s philosophical principles. For obvious reasons, this approach 
to epistemology turned out to be a great obstacle for the development of empirical sciences. 
Modern philosophy and science have undermined the Socratic conception of conceptual 
thought, but they have not undermined the need for conceptual thought that would provide 
for epistemic (and normative) objectivity (as opposed to ideational thought). What was 
genuinely new, however, was a fierce revolt against absolutisms of every sort, especially 
against religious and political apriorisms that were supposed to have an exclusive say about 
what should count as truly objective, valuable, and real. Modern conceptions of conceptual 
thought draw on the idea of “rule-mastering” – of learning how to efficiently use concepts in 
meaningful sentences and different contexts. Rule-mastering is a socially developed skill, 
which means that it does not, and cannot, exist in isolation, but only against the backdrop of 
rule-following in a specific social context. For this reason, concepts are no longer conceived 
as mental entities and structures instantiated “in the head” of an individual, but as realities 
embedded in a broader social practice of rule-following. Concepts are said to be non-private 
and intersubjective; they belong to the objective domain of sense and reference, and not to 
names, sentences, or ideas. A vocal proponent of the objectivity of concepts and their 
principled distinction from ideas was Gottlob Frege; in his view, however, the objectivity of 
concepts and thoughts resided principally in the trans-subjective and non-empirical realm of 
pure sense, which harkens back to Platonism [4]. In contrast to Frege, I construe mental 
objectivity in terms of the intersubjective practice of following rules of meaningful speech and 
action [5], which has strong affinities with the philosophy of the late Ludwig Wittgenstein. 
Providing definitions is merely an auxiliary and not the principal way of introducing concepts 
into language and thinking. Even in natural sciences, a vast number of concepts is introduced 
by means of typical examples (specimens) and collections of typical properties of objects: 
similarities between an object and a set of typical examples correspond (approximately) to 
what was previously construed as differentia specifica, while sets of typical properties stand 
for (approximately) genus proximus. Note, however, that, due to the “vagueness” of 
empirical concepts, what we are dealing with here are not, and cannot be, clearly defined 
relations and collections of properties (i.e. definitions in the classical Aristotelian sense). 
Ludwig Wittgenstein called our attention to yet another category of concepts that are 
explicitly dependent on typical examples and typical properties. These concepts cover a 
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broad set of phenomena or objectivities that cannot, even in principle, be lumped together 
under a common definitional denominator. With concepts of this type, the most we can do is 
to provide sub-types, which can then be further characterized by typical examples and/or 
properties of members of the same family. We know that it is usually impossible to identify 
non-trivial common features that would characterize all members of a given family and 
distinguish them from members of other families. What we can do, however, is determine 
what it is that connects all sisters, all brothers, brothers and sisters, fathers and sons, mothers 
and daughters, the father and the mother, etc. These partial similarities correspond to typical 
properties connecting different family members; but there are no non-trivial properties that 
would determine all family members. Wittgenstein calls these types of similarities “family 
resemblances” [6; pp.65-72]; following his lead, I refer to concepts which are based on 
family resemblances “family concepts”. 
The impossibility of providing clear-cut definitions for most concepts, their “vagueness” and 
embeddedness in larger frameworks of family resemblances, have thrown a rather grim light 
on the idea that concepts have a priori, purely rational content. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that concepts, as something that is principally different from ideas, are 
merely illusions of the mind and language, as claimed by some radical empiricists (e.g. 
Quine, Sellars, etc.). A given concept encompasses not only all actual examples, i.e., all 
actual objects corresponding to the content of the concept, but also all potential (non-actual) 
examples. The concept “human being”, for example, covers not only all real human beings 
that have lived, live, or will live in our cosmos, but also all possible human beings. 
According to a strictly extensionalist view, a concept is determined by its extension, which 
comprises a set or a class of all actual examples of a concept. But this approach seems 
unsatisfactory, as it tends to overlook “counterfactual” aspects of concepts. Understanding a 
concept opens up the domain of real counterfactual propositions of the type “If it were the 
case that A, then it would be the case that B”, which cannot be reduced to indicative 
conditionals of the type “If A is (not) …, then B is (not) …” and additional conditions, unless 
the latter are themselves counterfactual in nature. But the very fact that counterfactuals refer 
to non-actual, yet possible situations and objects, indicates that they represent the move from 
the actual to the possible, the merely conceptual, even the a priori [7, 8]. Here, a question can 
be raised as to what do concepts and conceptual thinking actually stand for: Do we really 
need to rely on some a priori knowledge of ideal realities, such as Platonic ideas, Aristotelian 
essences or Kantian transcendental forms of pure thought? This is where we run into the third 
“ingredient” of my paper, the reality and the concept of the spirit. 
Intuitive thought is an extension of conceptual thought. Contemplation, which is an essential 
element of intuitive thought, is said to be able to (at least partially) transcend sensual perception 
and provide us with momentary and supposedly non-rational insights into a given problem. 
It can take place on a very rudimentary, “pre-rational” level (e.g. the early stages of the 
mental development in children, states of narrowed consciousness, etc.) or on a trans-rational 
level in the form of synthetic and holistic insights [9]. However, the popular impression that 
intuitive thought excludes conceptuality per se is misleading, because – barring the 
prerational “knowledge” in young children or the transrational consciousness found in 
trances, mystical experiences, etc. – it is still based on tacit (hidden) mental activity that is 
running in the background and ultimately gives intuitive insights. 
Highly developed intuitive thinking is similar to perception in that it makes us intellectually 
aware of abstract ideas, just as sensual perception makes us aware of sensual objects [10]. 
It bears emphasizing, however, that intuitive insights do not disclose “immediate truths”; on 




reasonable assumptions about the problem we are trying to solve. Intuitive thought surpasses 
the power of conceptual analysis in its ability to garner wholesome insights into the nature of 
the problem, but it lacks the clarity and comprehensiveness of the latter. For this reason, 
intuitive thinking can be deemed valuable and reliable only if preceded by rigorous 
conceptual analysis. The impression of immediacy and directness of intuitive thought is a 
mental delusion of some sort, which can function as a powerful motivating factor for 
accepting certain synthetic insights as a starting-point for further deliberation and action; but 
it can also be misleading in that it conjures up a sense of finality and absolute clarity. 
Intuitive thinking is often used for non-epistemic and practical purposes, e.g., aesthetic and 
moral deliberations, examining individual choices in decision-making, deepening our 
spiritual beliefs, etc. It is therefore difficult to pass judgment on its epistemic contributions, 
and needs to be interpreted against the backdrop of these practical purposes. But in the face 
of thorny disputes between proponents and opponents of different aesthetic, artistic, moral, 
political or religious ideas, the epistemological analysis of its main achievements runs the risk 
of becoming an unproductive squabble over principles or even over taste. Here, a wise course 
of action would be to simply stick to the principles of “common sense”, comprising 
experience, well-grounded conceptual thinking, and critical introspection, with the proviso 
that even these methods are limited and fallible. It is therefore safe to conclude that 
conceptual thought plays a central role in intellectual endeavors of human beings, because it 
alone provides clearly articulated contents of intellectual activity. 
Let me end this section with a word of “Wittgensteinian” advice: all methods that build on 
something that was originally accessible only to the individual are in need of external criteria and 
assessment [6; p.580]. This is the only way we can hope to achieve intersubjective comparability 
and general validity of insights that were attained by pure reasoning or intuition [5]. 
SPIRIT (SLO. DUH) 
In contemporary philosophy, especially in contemporary philosophy of mind and philosophy 
of cognitive science, terms like “consciousness”, “mentality”, “mind”, and “spirit” are often 
conflated. English language uses the “all-embracing” term “mind”, whose universality makes 
it impossible to translate it into Slovene and other European languages. The Latin 
“cogitatum” is of similar cloth, and denotes far more than only “thinking”, which is the most 
common translation of the term. Germans have a similar word “Geist”, whose meaning, 
however, is much more definite, and usually refers to those aspects of mental and cultural  
life that involve self-awareness and self-reflection. In this regard, the Slovene term “duh” 
(here: “spirit”) is much closer to the German “Geist”. 
The tradition of modern subjectivism (hearkening back to at least the time of Descartes) 
played a crucial role in the fact that we now understand human mental life as the internal 
essence of an individual and that we so greatly cherish the identity of consciousness, mind, 
and spirit, but also of mental and cognitive states. In so doing, however, we tend to overlook 
the intersubjective and transpersonal aspects of epistemic, evaluative, and emotive processes. 
I call this view “spiritual individualism”, and it is clear that it hinders our understanding of 
epistemic, evaluative, and emotive modalities, which are important for many people who 
share a common social, cultural or institutional environment. Further, spiritual individualism 
reduces these complex phenomena to individual forms of knowledge, cognition, evaluation, 
and understanding, thereby neglecting inherently transpersonal and objective meanings, 
truths, and values. In my opinion, such understanding gives rise to false conceptions of both 
individual and social phenomena, and has contributed significantly to the crisis of the 
contemporary human world [11]. 
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It is my contention that cognitive science and philosophy of mind need to reaffirm the 
concept of spirit, or more precisely, the concept of objective spirit. The concept of spirit 
includes both individual and trans-individual (inter- and trans-subjective) potentialities for 
competent behavior in one’s life world, but also for the enactment of these potentialities in 
consciousnesses and minds of individuals as well as in “spiritual productions” of people in 
the course of human history. It therefore cannot be reduced to conscious or mental acts of 
individuals: spirit is necessarily trans-individual, although it can be partially grasped by 
individual minds and consciousnesses. 
In what follows, I will steer clear of the attempts that try to reduce the spirit to individual 
cognitive functions and the attempts that try to metaphysically objectify the spirit. I strongly 
oppose (neo)positivist tendencies in contemporary philosophy and science which claim that 
the concept of spirit is obsolete and lies outside the purview of science. It is well-known that 
the most comprehensive theory of spirit was put forward by Hegel. In his view, spirit is some 
sort of synthesis and extension of logic and nature. Hegel studies spirit under three headings: 
subjective spirit, objective spirit, and absolute spirit. Subjective spirit is (in brief) the 
aspiration of a conscious subject towards freedom and the realization of freedom for an 
individual; objective spirit is the capacity of a human being of rational identification with, 
and differentiation from, other people in the medium of freedom; and lastly, absolute spirit is 
the identification of spirit with the absolute idea, as realized in the highest achievements of 
human culture: religion, art, and philosophical sciences. The most innovative part of Hegel’s 
theory of spirit is his concept of objective spirit, encompassing, as it does, objective human 
achievements in both social and cultural domains (e.g. morality, law, state). Some prominent 




 century have modified Hegel’s ideas in the vein of 
historicism or phenomenology (Dilthey, Simmel, Cassirer, Hartmann). In what follows, I will 
draw on some reformulations of the concept of objective spirit, as provided by the 
phenomenologist Nicolai Hartmann in his book The Problem of the Spiritual Being [12], and 
add some of my own insights. 
Both Hegel and Hartman agree that spirit, although closely aligned with mind and consciousness, 
cannot be reduced to either of the two. “Spirituality” of human consciousness is reflected in 
the fact that we, as human beings, are open not only to the (physical) environment, but to the 
world. People need a common “spiritual sphere”, in which they grow in proportion to their 
social responsibility and cultural awareness. This “sphere” is more than a mere sum of 
individuals who are socially and culturally active, and is also not to be mistaken with an 
abstraction from individual consciousnesses and minds; instead, it is a unique reality, which 
they inhabit just as they inhabit the material world. In Hartmann’s words: “Mere consciousness 
separates people from one another; it is spirit that unites them [12; p.61]” However, according 
to Hartmann, spiritual reality is not independent of nature or ontologically primary, as it was 
the case with traditional metaphysics and Hegel, but can only evolve and maintain itself 
against the backdrop of material reality, in which human beings exist as living entities. 
Hartmann distinguishes between personal (subjective) and objective spirit, discarding Hegel’s 
notion of absolute spirit and “subsuming” its main characteristics under the heading of 
objective spirit. Only personal spirit can be said to “have” consciousness: it provides human 
beings with the ability of self-awareness (sense of self) and of ethically responsible 
behaviour; objective spirit, on the other hand, pertains to social communities, nations, and 
cultures. “Within” the category of objective spirit, Hartman distinguishes a further 
subcategory, namely that of “objectivized spirit”. The latter is construed as the totality of 
objectifications of objective spirit in the form of productions of human culture, e.g., works of 
art and science with lasting and transpersonal value and meaning. For Hartmann, spirit exists 




creative and dynamic. Objective and personal spirit mutually support and complement each 
other: personal spirit finds its highest expression in the achievements of objective spirit, 
whereas objective spirit can live only in and through individual spiritual productions. 
Objective spirit is not to be understood as a “subconscious” or “transconscious” entity. 
Hartman’s conception of spirit has its strengths and weaknesses. Its strengths are undoubtedly 
its “non-metaphysicality”, its strict rejection of subjectifying and objectifying tendencies in 
the current approaches to spirit; its weaknesses lie primarily in its inability to elucidate what 
the relative independence of (objective) spirit in relation to individuals or “personal spirits” 
actually pertains to. I feel that these flaws can be at least partially remedied by drawing on 
some of the ideas found in the late Wittgenstein’s philosophy. 
In his Philosophical Investigations [6], Wittgenstein uses a concept that is quite similar to 
Hartmann’s notion of objective spirit, namely “form of life” (Lebensform). Wittgenstein 
suggests that, by following rules that regulate our speech, thinking, and acting, we become 
embedded in a network of behaviors which he collectively refers to as a form of life. A form 
of life is usually shared by a group of people with common culture, language, customs, etc., 
and provides for considerable coherence in actions, meanings, verbal expressions, and norms 
among members of the group. It is “what has to be accepted, the given” [6; pp.572]. Language, 
thoughts, and intentions are all part of human forms of life, with language playing the central 
role. If a human being is to survive as a social being, it is necessary to presuppose a certain level 
of coherence and interconnectedness between different types of linguistic and non-linguistic 
behavior. It is safe to assume that there is a considerable amount of congruity between people 
who follow a common set of rules, although, as Wittgenstein never tires of insisting, there is 
no external or internal force that would actually make them behave in such a uniform way. 
To my mind, the transpersonal meaning, value, truth and meaning of ideas, concepts, 
propositions, actions, and human artefacts stem from a network of basic rules that are 
followed “blindly” or in a very similar, perhaps even identical, fashion by members of a 
community sharing a common form of life. By “blind” I mean that it does not require any 
deliberation on the part of an individual as to whether it is (in)correct to follow the rules that 
she, in fact, follows. All the other rules that are present within the same form of life can be 
deduced from these fundamental rules. However, to follow a rule blindly does not mean that 
all people in similar or identical situations follow it in the same way; but it does mean that 
similarities between different “styles” of rule-following are so pronounced that it is safe to 
assume that people deviate from the “common” rule-following very rarely. The rule-
following uniformity is significantly reduced in the case of higher (more complex) rules: 
Think of a great variety of linguistic utterances and of occasionally very “creative” ways of 
grammatical rule-following in live speech. It could be maintained that the normative validity 
of human behavior “supervenes” on the fundamental correspondence between words and 
actions, i.e. on the blind following of fundamental rules pertaining to a given form of life. 
This supervenience is facilitated by a specific set of (relatively) fixed “objects” functioning as 
rule-following exemplars, norms or standards. These “objects” play a central role in 
education and upbringing and in mediating discussions and conflicts. 
However, it bears emphasizing that blind rule-following needs to be conceived not as an 
individual, but rather as a communal practice. It has developed in a communal setting as the 
result of group-based training processes, which enable each individual to gain proficiency in 
relevant rule-following patterns, thereby “freeing her of all doubts” as to how a given rule is 
to be used in specific contexts. 
In the remaining few paragraphs, I would like to defend the following thesis: the fundamental 
form of objective spirit of individuals who share a common form of life encompasses a 
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dynamic wholeness of rules (pertaining to language use, epistemic norms, etc.) in a given 
inter- and trans-personal situation of human life [11; p.97]. 
I use the term “wholeness”, and not “totality”, because totalities are mostly conceived as 
abstract objects, whereas in the case of objective spirit we are referring to an implicit 
“wholeness” which is not an object, but a generalized aspect of the mastering of the situation.  
The proposed concept of spirit is defined situationally and contextually, and therefore cannot 
be reduced to one specific situation. The core of objective spirit is to be found in the 
wholeness of implicit and often subconscious presuppositions underlying both our abilities to 
understand and sensibly react to a given situation, as well as in the implicit consequences that 
follow from such an understanding and (re)acting. To simplify: the purported wholeness of 
rules stands for “the objective spirit of a given situation”. People act and react first and 
foremost to the given social situation that seems relevant for them. Their primary and most 
lively “contacts” with the sphere of objective spirit (of their community at a given historical 
time) are made in and through their specific social situations. Such situations are, for 
example, interpersonal interaction and communication, cooperation with other people, 
everyday situations at work, in the family and during leisure, even fleeting occasions of being 
together with others at the same place. 
The proposed concept of spirit is defined situationally and contextually, and therefore cannot 
be reduced to one specific situation. The core of objective spirit is to be found in the totality 
of implicit and often subconscious presuppositions underlying our ability to understand, and 
sensibly react to, a given situation, as well as in the implicit consequences that follow from 
such understanding and (re)acting. To simplify: the purported totality of rules stands for “the 
objective spirit of a given situation”. 
The objective spirit of a concrete social situation is of course only the most fundamental, 
elementary form of objective spirit. Higher and more complex forms of objective spirit are 
instantiated in more complex and permanent forms of social situations, e.g., in social 
institutions, media, and means of mass communication (e.g. mass media), etc. I do not, 
however, presuppose the existence of the “highest” form of objective spirit – the objective 
spirit of humanity as a whole, which would encompass all “lower” forms of objective spirit as 
its elements, aspects, or modes. It is true that, in contemporary “internet society”, one might 
talk of “spirit of humanity in the present”, but this too seems to be more like an idealization 
or an idealized spiritual potential of humanity in the present than the actual “state of spirit” 
that would impose specific content or rules on all “lower” forms of objective spirit. 
It is possible, however, to conceive of constituents (elements) of objective spirit as specific 
types of abstract objects – call them “productions of spirit” or “spiritual productions” (e.g. 
content of works of art and science). Although such understanding is but a linguistic fiction, 
it has real implications on the way people think, speak, and act. The explicit or implicit belief 
in the existence of abstract contents “situated” in the sphere of objective spirit is but an 
idealized consequence or an end result of a given set of conditionals which all competent rule 
followers of a given community (with a given form of life) at least tacitly accept in their 
everyday social practices. 
Every “example” or “instantiation” of objective spirit differs in how it is experienced or 
conceived by individual human beings, because it is only latently or potentially present in 
experiences, conceptions, utterances, and actions, whereas the very act of experiencing or 
conceiving is something actual. For example, the content of a certain work of art serves only 
as a potential for its being experienced or conceived by a group of concrete individuals in 




in concrete acts of consciousness and understanding of a group of sufficiently motivated and 
attentive individuals. In such cases, objective spirit can be said to realize itself in and through 
these individuals. Following the example of Hartmann, I use the term “objectified spirit” for 
cases where the actualization of spirit is associated with a certain public and objectified 
expression of spirit, e.g. in a work of art or science. 
But what is the “medium” or “vehicle”, whereby the transpersonal potential of objective spirit 
can enter into the mind or consciousness of an individual and society at large without the 
mediation of concrete objectifications of spirit? Vincent Descombes refers to these 
fundamental vehicles of objective spirit as “institutions of meaning” [13, 14]. Social 
institutions have their own lives and enable us to think and deliberate on things that cannot be 
successfully resolved only “in our heads”. Similar ideas to those proposed by Descombes can 
be found in notions, such as “mental institutions” and “socially distributed minds” by 
Gallagher and Crisafi [15, 16], and “extended minds” by Clark and Chalmers [17]. The main 
difference, it would seem, lies in the fact that Descombes speaks of the realm of meaning, 
which is “embodied” in social institutions, while the other authors speak of the process of 
distribution, externalization, and extension of the mind, which occurs when one uses one’s 
mind and consciousness in social contexts. The process itself is supervenient on mental states 
and processes of personal, environmental and social origin, but cannot be reduced to them. It 
could therefore be claimed that Descombes focuses more on the structural, while the other 
authors attend primarily to the processual aspect of objective spirit. I see these approaches as 
an important development in the history of spirit, which is much more in tune with Hegel’s 
original dialectic, as is the case with many of the more speculative interpretations of his 
philosophy. If we construe objective spirit as something that is alive, then it must manifest 
itself as an ongoing process of externalization and distribution by means of different sources 
of meaning and knowledge that are usually embedded in processes that transcend the strictly 
mental and/or conscious domain. The central aspect of this all-encompassing activity is the 
already mentioned process of rule-following in its multifarious guises (the latter is to be 
conceived very broadly, so as to also include changes of rules and their general application). 
Historically, the concept of spirit was often criticized because of the idea of cosmic or even 
trans-cosmic spirit. Speculative suggestions of this type cannot be verified scientifically, and 
are often explicitly metaphysical in nature. But they are not completely irrational, as they 
allow for rational speculation about the existence of such spiritual dimensions. For example, 
some interpretations of quantum mechanics allow for, or even demand, the existence of 
“cosmic observers” whose “role” is to constantly “break” the holistic cosmic quantum potential, 
which is formally represented by a common wave function of all physical processes in the 
cosmos, comprising trans-chronological and trans-spatial superpositions of mutually entangled 
cosmic quantum states. The purported cosmic observers “break” the quantum potential into a 
set of stochastic (mostly non-linear) assemblies of different real possibilities, manifesting 
themselves as physical events [18-20]. Similar ideas can also be found in Bohm’s theory of 
cosmic quantum potential and implicate order, which “enfolds” itself into consciousness and 
cosmos [21]. Another important source of hypotheses about the cosmic or trans-cosmic spirit are 
altered states of consciousness, e.g. mystical states, artistic trances, drug-induced experiences, 
etc., which “throw” the person out of herself and into a spiritual world of some sort. 
It is hard to draw any firm conclusions as to the validity of such speculations, as they are in 
need of additional theoretical and empirical research both in the field of quantum cosmology 
and the field of altered states of consciousness [22]. In the chapter on spirit in physical reality 
in my book Mind in Nature, I outline some rudimentary ideas about consciousness construed 
as a field of potentiality that gets actualized through the experiential actor’s becoming aware 
of her experiential flow, which can be, at least formally, compared to certain aspects of 
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quantum-mechanical potentialities and their actualizations in physical observations [23]. But 
the consciousness of a person who experiences and directs these leaps from inattentiveness to 
attentiveness transcends the domain and scope of quantum mechanical aspects of experiential 
consciousness. As noted in my critical survey of quantum models of consciousness, this 
requires that we posit a special experiential perspective, “denoting awareness or cognizing of 
the experiential subject’s token- and type-specific experiential perspective, which – in human 
beings – translates into an awareness of the ever-changing aspects of one’s actual presence … 
in relation to personally, socially and historically definable chronological and spatial 
closeness/remoteness of things and events experienced by the subject” [24; pp.95-96]. This, 
however, transcends the domain of experience and consciousness en masse, and demands that 
we pay heed to the subject-accessible knowledge of her specific relations to the world which 
she shares with other people. We are dealing here with a strictly spiritual domain, or more 
precisely, with the objective spirit of different situations experienced by an individual and 
shared by other people with which she interacts. 
Thus, it would seem that quantum models of consciousness also transcend the realm of mind 
and consciousness, and presuppose the existence of spirit construed as a trans- and 
interpersonal potentiality that manifests itself in and through “breaks” of actual realizations of 
personal spirit in individuals. Cosmic dimensions of spirit are undoubtedly interesting, but (at 
least at this point) not elaborate enough to help us (co)construct the concept of spirit, which I 
identify with the concept of objective spirit, an indispensable feature of human life. 
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